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I. Introduction 
 
Tort law distinguishes between private and public nuisances.  A private nuisance is an 
intentional and unreasonable interference with the quiet use and enjoyment of property.  
A public nuisance is an intentional and unreasonable interference with rights that are 
common to the public. 
 
Commentators have described nuisance law as an impenetrable jungle, and have 
suggested that private and public nuisance law be given different labels to avoid the 
tendency to view them as equivalent legal doctrines.1  The theoretical underpinnings of 
private nuisance law are difficult enough to explain, and there has been little effort in the 
literature to explore them in depth. In comparison, public nuisance law remains an 
unexplored area from the perspective of theorists.  The case law on public nuisance that is 
taught in law schools is scant, and what is provided is almost totally void of any 
theoretical justification beyond the circular pronouncements of the courts. 
 
Over this background comes a new set of challenges for public nuisance doctrine.  State 
attorneys general have latched on to public nuisance doctrine as a handy tool for public 
interest litigation.  Public nuisance lawsuits have been brought against gun manufacturers 
for gun-related murders in cities, and more recently against paint manufacturers for the 
costs of removing lead paint from homes. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to look closely at the theoretical underpinnings of public 
nuisance doctrine.  I will examine its relationship to private nuisance doctrine, and use 
the theoretical framework developed here to set out an account of the doctrine’s scope, 
and its relevance to modern public interest litigation. 
 
In contrast to the traditional legal commentary, I find nuisance law a coherent body of 
rules that serves an explainable function.  Nuisance optimally regulates activity levels.  
Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially optimal activity levels by imposing 
liability when externalized costs are far in excess of externalized benefits or far in excess 
of background external costs.  This theory explains nuisance doctrine. 
 
The new enforcement actions for lead paint abatement or gun control purposes have an 
arguable theoretical basis in nuisance law.  However, as currently framed, the lawsuits 
are inconsistent with significant parts of the doctrine and the theory. 
 
II. Descriptive and Intuitive Legal Distinctions 
 
Public nuisance cases involve interferences with rights common to the public, while 
private nuisance cases involve interferences with rights of property owners.  In this part I 
will explore the relationship between public and private nuisance, employing intuitive 
                                                 
1 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (1971).  In spite of Prosser’s description of 
nuisance law as a jungle, he did an admirable job of clearing some paths through it. 
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arguments.  In the following parts of this paper I will set out an economic framework for 
nuisance doctrine which includes public nuisance doctrine as a part. 
 
Rights protected by private nuisance are easy to explain: they are the rights landowners 
anticipate having protected as part of ownership of property.  Property owners expect to 
have the right to enjoy their property, within limits.  This implies some minimal ability to 
remain on the property, and not be driven off, or find it intolerable, because of noise, bad 
smells, harsh lights, pollution, or other invasions.  
 
The common law has traditionally distinguished private nuisance from trespass on the 
ground that trespass involves an invasion of the right to exclusive possession, while 
nuisance involves an invasion of the right to quiet use and enjoyment of property.  Thus, 
a trespass claim involves a physical displacement from some portion of a property; as 
when a large object invades the property.  A nuisance claim, on the other hand, involves 
no physical displacement or occupation of space; it is enough that the property owner (or 
possessor) cannot exist on his property without suffering an invasive interference that 
substantially diminishes his valuation of the property. 
 
Public nuisance is said to protect rights common to the public rather than rights of 
property owners.  Rights common to the public are likely to be somewhat more 
circumscribed than those of property owners.  Still, the list of rights protected by public 
nuisance is substantial.  Public nuisance law has protected rights to safety, to health, to 
reasonable comfort and convenience, and even to freedom from moral effrontery.2  Of 
course, the rights protected by public nuisance are also protected by private nuisance, 
provided that the interference disturbs an individual in his capacity as possessor of 
property. 
 
The traditional common law rule held that the complainant in a public nuisance case 
could bring suit as long has his damage is special, or particular to him, and not shared by 
the general public.  This seems to be a paradox, given that public nuisance law is 
designed to protect the rights of the public.  The government, however, may bring an 
action to shut down a public nuisance without showing any proof that a victim has 
suffered a particular harm.  In other words, private individuals are denied the right to sue 
on the basis of the general interferences suffered by the public. 
 
One classic example of a public nuisance is the malarial pond.3  First, consider the 
malarial pond as a private nuisance.  If landowner A has a malarial pond on his property, 
adjacent landowner B will be permitted under the law to sue for damages, and probably 
an injunction, on the basis of private nuisance doctrine.  It should be clear that a malarial 
pond constitutes an interference with the quiet use and enjoyment of property of an 
adjacent landowner.  The adjacent landowner will have to stay indoors to avoid being 
bitten by the mosquitoes, and may have to change his daily routine in order to minimize 
the risk of contracting malaria.  These harms are sufficient to bring a claim for private 
nuisance.  In addition, the law implies liability when the invasion created by the malarial 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 1, at 583-584. 
3 Mills v. Hall & Richards, 9 Wend. 315 (N.Y. 1832). 
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pond is both intentional and unreasonable.  It will be found to be intentional if the 
landowner with the pond is aware of its presence and its likely impact on the adjacent 
landowner.  The law has failed to provide a concise definition of what it means to be 
unreasonable, but it is understood that this introduces a type of cost-benefit balance into 
the analysis.  Since there are few benefits that would make it reasonable to have a 
malarial pond, a finding of liability would be likely in this case. 
 
Now consider the malarial pond as a public nuisance.  It interferes with the public’s 
health as well as convenience.  People who walk within the vicinity of the malarial pond 
are at risk of infection from the mosquitoes.  If they are aware of the risk, they will 
change their walking routes to avoid coming close to the pond.  These are substantial 
interferences, but they are insufficient to give a plaintiff a right to sue under public 
nuisance doctrine.  To have a right to sue under public nuisance doctrine, the plaintiff has 
to suffer a particular harm that is greater than that suffered by the general public.  For 
example, if the plaintiff suffers a mosquito bite that leads to malaria, that will be 
sufficient to satisfy the particular harm requirement.  The requirements of intentionality 
and unreasonableness apply, just as in the case of a private nuisance claim. 
 
Public nuisance law embodies the conviction that a member of the public has at least 
some of the rights enjoyed by landowners; or, more precisely, that there are public rights 
unconnected to status such as landownership or contractual promisee.  It seems intuitive, 
however, that the rights of the public should not be as great in scope as those of a 
landowner.  Owning land brings with it expectations of protections that ordinarily do not 
accompany mere existence as a member of the public.  For example, landownership 
brings with it the protections of trespass law, which have no bearing in the case of 
someone who simply occupies public space. 
 
Why should the law of public nuisance require that the plaintiff suffer a particular harm, 
rather than a general harm of the sort suffered by the public?  One can offer intuitive 
arguments.  The member of the public has to be willing to put up with the inconveniences 
that come along with that status.  No one has a guarantee to comfort, convenience, or 
complete safety in the exercise of public rights or in connection to the occupation of 
public space.  Some level of inconvenience has to be tolerated as part of membership in 
society.  In addition, permitting individuals to sue for harms general to the public runs the 
risk of fraudulent claims.  Courts cannot distinguish between those who suffered these 
general harms from those who suffered no harm at all.  A court cannot distinguish 
someone who altered his route significantly to avoid coming close to the malarial pond 
from someone who did not have to alter his route significantly.  The administrative costs 
of sorting valid from phony claims would be enormous. 
 
In terms of tort doctrine, these intuitive arguments imply a different view of the implicit 
cost-benefit balancing observed in the private nuisance cases.  When one exercises rights 
of the public, one must assume some of the risks associated with the exercise of those 
rights.  This can be contrasted to the private property ownership case.  When one owns a 
parcel of property, one expects a certain degree of protection from trespasses and other 
invasions that would substantially reduce the value of ownership.  From an assumption-
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of-risk perspective, then, it would appear that the interferences required to justify a claim 
for damages should be greater in the public sphere than in the private property realm.  
The law embodies this intuitive perspective in its distinction between the types of harm 
necessary to support public and private nuisance damage claims. 
 
These are intuitive arguments for the particular harm requirement, though I will attempt 
to provide a more rigorous grounding for them in this paper.  More importantly, I will 
attempt to provide a rigorous account of the function of public nuisance doctrine and its 
scope. 
 
III. Understanding Nuisance Doctrine 
 
Although commentators have suggested that public and private nuisance doctrines are 
sufficiently unrelated that they should have entirely different labels in order to avoid 
confusion,4 I will argue that the two doctrines are in fact closely related, and have a 
common theoretical core.  That core can be explained on the basis of the economic model 
of strict liability. 
 
In this part, I will set out the building blocks of an economic theory of nuisance doctrine.5  
The distinction between activity and care levels is the starting point. 
 
A. Activity Levels, Care Levels, and Externalities 
 
The law and economics literature distinguishes care and activity levels.6  The care level 
refers to the level of instantaneous precaution that an actor takes when engaged in some 
activity.  For example, an actor can take more care while in the activity of driving by 
moderating his speed or looking more frequently to both sides of the road.  The activity 
level refers the actor’s decision with respect to the frequency or location of his activity.  
If, for example, the activity of concern is driving, it can be reduced by driving less 
frequently.  Alternatively, a driver can change the nature of the activity by altering its 
location or the technology used in it.  Changing the frequency, location or technology of 
engaging in an activity are all methods of altering the activity level. 
 
The invasions associated with nuisance law can be viewed as external costs associated 
with activity level choices.  Consider, for example, a manufacturer that dumps toxic 
                                                 
4 Prosser, supra note 1, at 573. 
5 The economic theory of nuisance doctrine can be traced to its brief treatment by Coase.  Ronald H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  The first detailed examination of the economics of 
nuisance law is that of Merrill, see Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining. 
Property Rights, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 13 (1985).  Building on Coase, Merrill provides a transaction-cost theory 
of nuisance law.  More recently, the transaction cost theory has been extended by Henry Smith, see Henry 
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).  The 
transaction-cost approach is essential for understanding the reasons trespass law cannot serve as a 
functional substitute to nuisance law.  Moreover, some features of the scope of nuisance law, such as the 
general exclusion of liability for aesthetic disturbances, are best described by transaction cost theory.  
However, the doctrines of nuisance law reflect considerations that go beyond the transaction cost theory. 
6 See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). 
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chemicals into the water as a byproduct of its manufacturing activity.  Suppose the 
manufacturer is taking the level of care required by negligence law (reasonable care), 
and, in spite of this, the manufacturing process leads to some level of discharge of toxic 
chemicals.  In this case, the environmental harm is a negative externality associated with 
the manufacturer’s activity level choice. 
 
Whether we are considering the activity of driving a car or that of manufacturing, the 
model examined here is of activities that impose external costs on society even when they 
are carried out with reasonable care.  The question I consider is how the law can regulate 
activity levels in a way that leads to approximately socially optimal decisions.  I will 
argue that nuisance law appears to accomplish this goal. 
 
I assume in the model below that there are two liability rules that can be applied to actors, 
strict liability and negligence.7  Under either rule, actors are assumed to take reasonable 
care.  
   
B. The Economics of Activity Level Choices 
 
For any activity, the actor engaged in it will set his privately optimal level at the point 
which maximizes his utility from that activity.  That means the actor will consider the 
benefits he derives from the activity as well as the costs, and choose a level at which the 
excess of private benefits over private costs is at its maximum.  If b(y) represents the 
private benefit enjoyed by the actor at activity level y, and c(y) represents the private cost, 
the actor will increase his activity level until 
 
b'(y) = c'(y) ,     (1) 
 
where b'(y) represents the marginal private benefit (MPB) to the actor and c'(y) represents 
the marginal private cost (MPC).  The actor’s privately optimal activity level choice is 
given by the intersection of MPB and MPC in Figure 1 (point A).8 
 
There are negative externalities (or external costs) associated with many activities.  
Suppose the activity is driving.  With each mile driven, the actor imposes some risk of 
harm from an accident or from pollution on the public in general.  Or, if the activity is 
manufacturing, with each widget produced, a manufacturer who discharges chemicals in 
the water imposes clean-up costs on others.  The marginal social cost of the actor’s 
activity is simply the sum of the marginal private cost and the marginal external cost 
                                                 
7 The model presented in this paper is based on that in Keith N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict 
Liability, forthcoming REV. LAW & ECON., 2008.  This model differs from the standard strict liability 
model in Shavell, supra note 6, which finds that strict liability is preferable to negligence when it is 
desirable to reduce injurers’ activity levels rather than victims’ activity levels.  The alternative model 
presented here focuses on the relationship between externalized costs and externalized benefits. 
8 Figure 1 assumes that marginal benefits diminish as the actor increases his activity level, which implies 
that the marginal private benefit schedule can be represented by a downward sloping line.  Marginal private 
benefits decline because the actor gains less in utility from an additional unit of the activity as his activity 
level expands.  The marginal private cost schedule is assumed to increase as the actor increases his level of 
activity (see MPC in figure 1). 
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imposed on society.  Thus if v(y) represents the external cost of the activity, the marginal 
social cost (MSC) is c'(y) + v'(y). 
 
1. Cost and Benefit Externalization: Single Activity Model 
 
It is possible that there are benefits to society generated by the actor’s activity.  For 
example, the provision of water to a building, even when carried out with great care, puts 
the tenant’s property at risk of damage from escaping water, but also benefits society by 
enhancing sanitation.9  Similarly, providing internet service to a home puts the resident’s 
computer at risk through the transmission of computer viruses, but also enhances the 
spread of information across society.  And consider driving again.  If the number of 
drivers increases from one to two, both drivers will have the added safety that if anything 
goes wrong on the road (e.g., a car falls into a pothole), they will find someone who can 
help them or call for help. 
 
The marginal social benefit is the sum of the marginal private benefit and the marginal 
external benefit of an additional unit of activity.  Thus, if z(y) represents the external 
benefit, the marginal social benefit (MSB) is b'(y) + z'(y). 
 
The final step of this economic analysis of activity level choices is to consider the 
differences between private and social incentives.  Social welfare is optimized when  
 
 b'(y) + z'(y) = c'(y) + v'(y)  .    (2) 
 
The level of activity that satisfies the social optimality condition may differ from the 
privately optimal level.  The socially and privately optimal activity levels will be the 
same if the cost and benefit externalities are equal; that is, z(y) = v(y).  If the external cost 
exceeds the external benefit at all activity levels, v'(y) > z'(y), then the privately optimal 
activity choice will exceed the socially optimal level; and the converse holds as well. 
 
Figure 1 can be used to elaborate.  Consider the case of low and roughly equivalent 
externalities on both the cost and benefit sides, as shown in by MSC (low externality) and 
MSB (low externality).  The socially optimal level of activity, which equates the marginal 
social benefit and the marginal social cost, is found at the point B in Figure 1.  The 
socially optimal level of activity (B) is roughly the same as the privately optimal level of 
activity (A).  The reason is that the modest positive and negative externalities cancel each 
other out. 
 
Consider the case of high externality on the cost side and low externality on the benefit 
side, as shown by the intersection of the MSC (high externality) and MSB (low 
externality), or point C in Figure 1.  Now there is a wide divergence between the 
privately optimal level of activity (A) and the socially optimal level of activity (C).  In 
this case it appears desirable for the government to intervene to reduce the level of 
activity.  Indeed, in the case of very high externality on the cost side (MSC (very high 
externality)) it may be desirable to shut down the activity completely. 
                                                 
9 See Rickards v. Lothian [1913] A.C. 263. 
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Finally, consider the case of low externality on the cost side and high externality on the 
benefit side, as shown at point D in Figure 1.  The privately optimal level of activity (A) 
is substantially below the socially optimal level (D).  The law should intervene to 
increase the level of activity. 
 
2. Cross Externalization of Costs and Benefits: Dual Activity Model 
 
In many settings, two actors cross externalize benefits and risk.  For example, on the 
roads, drivers impose accident risks on each other even when taking care (or they may 
externalize benefits).  Consider two actors S and T.  In the case of risk externalization, the 
activity cost function for S can be represented as  
 
          c(yS) + vST(yS,yT) + vTS(yS,yT)    (4) 
 
where vST represents the risk externalized from S to T as a function of both activity levels 
and vTS represents the risk externalized from T to S.  Assuming, for simplicity, that no 
benefits are externalized, the privately optimal activity level for S will be determined by 
 
              
S
TS
SS y
vycyb ∂
∂+= )(')('   ,    (4) 
 
and a similar result holds for actor T.  It should be clear that both actors will constrain 
their activity levels more than in the single activity case considered above, because they 
will take into account the risks they incur when increasing activity.  If the benefit and 
cost functions are the same for both actors, and ∂vTS/∂yS = ∂vST/∂yT, they will choose the 
same activity levels.  In the absence of externalized benefits, the privately optimal 
activity levels will be greater than the socially optimal levels.  If benefits are externalized, 
then it is no longer clear that the privately optimal activity levels are socially too high.  
Whether the privately optimal activity levels coincide with the socially optimal levels 
depends on the relationship between externalized benefits and externalized costs.
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C. Introducing the Law 
 
Since the actors are assumed to be taking reasonable care, the negligence rule cannot 
influence their activity level choices.10  The negligence rule holds the actor liable only 
when he fails to take reasonable care.  Since the actors are assumed to have taken 
reasonable care, the negligence rule will not lead to any findings of liability. 
 
Strict liability has the property that it imposes liability on actors even when they have 
taken reasonable care.  The legal system can influence activity levels through imposing 
strict liability.  In this part, I will examine the conditions under which strict liability leads 
to approximately optimal activity levels. 
 
First, consider the case in which externality is high on the cost side and low on the benefit 
side.  The socially optimal scale in this case is point C in Figure 1.  In the absence of 
strict liability, the privately optimal scale is point A.  Imposing strict liability on the actor 
is probably desirable in this case.  When strict liability is imposed on the actor, his 
marginal private cost schedule becomes equivalent to the marginal social cost schedule.  
In the case of high externality on the cost side coupled with low externality on the benefit 
side, the actor’s privately optimal activity level under strict liability will be point E.  It is 
not the socially optimal level, which is at point C, but it is close.  Social welfare will most 
likely be improved by using liability to lead the actor to choose level E rather than the 
socially excessive level A.  And I will argue below that there are narrower doctrines, such 
as proximate cause, that serve to adjust the activity level to the socially optimal point. 
 
Now consider the case in which externality is low both on the cost and on the benefit 
side.  The socially optimal scale of activity is associated with point B.  The privately 
optimal level of activity is associated with point A.  These are the same activity levels.  If 
strict liability is imposed on the actor, it will reduce his activity level below the socially 
optimal scale, and therefore reduce social welfare.  Strict liability will lead him to choose 
the scale F, which is below the socially optimal scale. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that strict liability is desirable in the single activity case 
only when the external costs of the activity substantially exceed the external benefits 
associated with the activity.  In this case imposing strict liability reduces activity levels to 
a point that is closer to the socially optimal scale than would be observed under the 
negligence rule.  When the external benefits are roughly equal to or greater than the 
social costs associated with the activity, strict liability is not socially desirable. 
 
Another case in which strict liability is not preferable to negligence is observed when two 
actors cross-externalize equivalent costs – the dual activity case.  When the costs 
                                                 
10 This assumes courts operate without error and that litigation is not costly.  If courts make mistakes and 
litigation is costly, compliance with the negligence standard does not reduce liability costs to zero.  On 
litigation costs and judicial error, see Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence, 
6 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 433 (1990). 
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externalized by two actors to each other are reciprocal,11 strict liability is not socially 
preferable to negligence.  The reason is that under strict liability, you will pay for harms 
to others, while under negligence (again, everyone is complying with the negligence 
standard in this model) you will pay for only for the harms you suffer.  Since those harms 
are the same, activity levels will not differ under the two regimes. 
 
D. Application to Nuisance Law 
 
I have presented an economic analysis of activity level choices and considered its 
implications for law.  Now I will examine the law, to see if it conforms to the predictions 
of the model. 
 
IV. Positive Theory of Nuisance Law 
 
Nuisance law has not been articulated clearly.  Of course, some parts of the doctrine are 
easily interpreted in light of similar tort rules.  Consider the legal definition of a nuisance: 
an intentional, nontrespassory and unreasonable invasion into the quiet use and 
enjoyment of property.  Intentional, in nuisance law, has always had a meaning similar to 
its meaning in the context of trespass law: it is enough if the defendant was aware of the 
nuisance, and the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant aimed to harm him.  
The term nontrespassory has always had the effect of distinguishing between invasions 
that interfere with exclusive possession of property or a portion of it (e.g., a boulder) and 
invasions that merely make it less desirable to remain in possession of property (e.g., 
smoke).  I will go beyond these comparisons with trespass doctrine to examine how this 
paper’s model justifies the definition and doctrines of nuisance. 
 
A. Nontrespassory Invasions 
 
The definition of a nuisance as a nontrespassory invasion distinguishes nuisances from 
trespasses and also from consensual transactions.  If the interference is the result of the 
consent of the victim, then it is not properly characterized as an invasion. 
 
The requirement of invasiveness is implicated by the externality model.  If the 
interference is consensual, in the sense that the affected party is fully aware of the nature 
of the interference and still contracts with the offending actor, then there is no need for 
the law to intervene to control the activity level of the offending actor.  The activity level 
will be regulated to the optimal level by the market.  Thus, if a person contracts with 
another to install a noisy furnace, and he is fully aware of the noise that will be emitted 
by the furnace when he enters the contract, he has no basis to bring a nuisance claim 
against the furnace supplier for the noise interference. 
                                                 
11 In terms of the model, this requires ∂vTS/∂yS = ∂vST/∂yS and ∂vST/∂yT = ∂vTS/∂yT.  If this condition holds, 
each actor (S and T) chooses the same activity levels under strict liability and under negligence.  If the 
conditions ∂vTS/∂yS = ∂vST/∂yT and ∂vTS/∂yT = ∂vST/∂yS hold, then S and T will choose the same activity level 
(i.e., the activity level of S will equal the activity level of T) under strict liability and under negligence 
(horizontal equivalence across actors in each regime), but this does not imply that strict liability is 
equivalent to negligent (equivalence for each actor across regimes).  For strict liability to be equivalent to 
negligence, the first two conditions above must hold. 
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B. Intentional Invasions 
 
The externality model provides a theory of intent in nuisance law.  The purpose of strict 
liability is to regulate activity levels.  In order to carry out this function, liability must be 
applied to actors that have sufficient information to have their activity level choices 
influenced by liability.  For example, an actor that decides to locate a smoke-belching 
factory next to a residential area must be aware of the invasions caused by the smoke 
from his factory if strict liability is going to have any impact on his initial location 
decision.12 
 
It follows that intention in nuisance law, at its core, does not mean intending to harm the 
victim, or intending to interfere with the victim’s use of his property.  It is sufficient that 
the actor has enough information to either be aware of or to easily foresee the harmful 
impact of his activity on others. 
 
C. Unreasonable Invasions 
 
Perhaps the most important and unclear term in the definition of nuisance is 
unreasonable.  There have been efforts to settle its meaning, but most of them are 
unsatisfying.13   
 
The theory of this paper suggests a clear interpretation for the reasonableness test of 
nuisance law.  The model presented in the previous part suggests that an unreasonable 
invasion is one that is associated with an activity for which: (a) the external costs 
substantially exceed the external benefits, or (b) the external costs thrown off by the 
defendant’s activity are not reciprocal to the external costs thrown off by other local 
activities.14  These two conditions describe the settings in which the law should intervene 
                                                 
12 It is quite likely that strict liability will have ex post effects on an actor’s scale or location decision.  After 
moving to a location, the burden of strict liability probably would induce a nuisance generator to scale back 
its activity and perhaps to move it to another location, even if the generator was not aware of the costs 
imposed on victims.  However, strict liability cannot affect ex ante incentives if the generator is unaware of 
the costs externalized to victims. 
13 For example, the Restatement (Second) Section 826 says: 
 
An intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if: 
(a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct, or 
(b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar 
harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible.13 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts: Unreasonableness of Intentional Invasion § 826 (1977).  This definition is 
questionable because it refers to the actor’s conduct rather than his activity.  The core question is whether 
the actor’s activity is one that imposes too many risks on others given its benefits (or given the costs 
reciprocated by others).  The second provision of Section 826 is almost useless, because it implies that 
strict liability should apply to any nontrivial interference with a person’s use and enjoyment of land. 
14 Many of the activities subjected to strict liability can be viewed as aggregations of risk rather than as 
different in kind from ordinary risks.  For example, the risk created by storing explosives is simply an 
aggregation of the risk anyone creates by storing something that can explode.  The unusual risk creation 
 12
to reduce an actor’s activity level.  Provided that the intentionality and nontrespassory 
descriptions apply to a particular invasion, the law should impose strict liability when the 
external costs exceed external benefits or are non-reciprocal. 
 
Nuisance doctrine is closely related to the law and theory of strict liability articulated in 
Rylands v. Fletcher.15  The Rylands court described several nuisance cases as falling 
within the rationale of its decision.  This is useful because the law on Rylands-based strict 
liability has been set out with much greater clarity than nuisance law. 
 
Using the theory of Rylands as the closest doctrinal source for nuisance law, we can set 
out the following test for a nuisance: 
 
(a) existence of a high degree of interference with the quiet use and enjoyment of 
land of others; 
(b) inability to eliminate the interference by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(c) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(d) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on and; 
(e) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its obnoxious 
            attributes. 
 
I will refer to this below as the nuisance test (or the five-factor test). These factors are 
based on the Restatement’s articulation of the Rylands doctrine in the form of a set of 
rules, in Section 520.  The foregoing five-factor test is an attempt to examine whether the 
external costs thrown off by a nuisance substantially exceed external benefits, or are 
reciprocated by background external costs of other activities. 
 
The first two factors of this test require that the interference be substantial even when the 
actor is taking reasonable care.   As in the case of abnormally dangerous activities, the 
first two factors should be treated as minimal requirements for nuisance liability.  If, in 
other words, the interference would be trivial if the actor took reasonable care, then the 
interference should not be considered a nuisance, and there is no need to examine the 
remaining factors of the test.16 
 
The remaining three components present the core of the reasonableness test in nuisance 
law.  The third factor, common usage, helps identify activities for which the risks are 
reciprocal to those of other common activities.  If an activity is one of common usage, 
then actors engaged in those activities will impose reciprocal risks on each other, and 
there is no basis for adopting strict liability over negligence.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that justifies strict liability can therefore be viewed as an aggregation or consolidation of risks which are 
ordinarily confronted in a dispersed and uncorrelated form. 
15 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).  The Rylands case treats ultrahazardous and nuisance cases as all part of the 
same general doctrine.  On the connection between Rylands and nuisance doctrine, see also Hylton, 
Positive Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 3.  
16 Judge Posner’s decision in Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 
1990), an ultrahazardous activity strict liability case, is consistent with this proposition. 
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The fourth factor, inappropriateness, is both another way of determining whether the 
activity imposes a reciprocated risk and a way of assessing whether the risks are balanced 
off by the external benefits.  Since the fourth factor focuses on the location, it should be 
treated as a type of assumption of risk test.  An activity would be considered appropriate 
for its location if its costs are typical of other activities in the locale, or if its external 
benefits would make it reasonable for someone in the area to tolerate the costs. 
 
The last factor asks the court to compare the benefits externalized by the activity and the 
costs externalized.  When the benefits are substantial, the last factor suggests that the 
court should be reluctant to impose liability on a nuisance theory.  Consider, for example, 
the noise generated by a fire station.  Suppose it is a particularly busy fire station.  The 
noise generated by fire trucks constantly moving in and out of the station with their 
alarms running could be deemed to substantially interfere with the quiet use and 
enjoyment of land by neighbors.  However, the neighbors also benefit by being located 
close to the fire station.  Since those benefits are substantial and widely dispersed, the 
neighbors should not be allowed to impose strict liability on a nuisance theory against the 
fire station.  There is no economic basis for using liability as an incentive to force the fire 
station to cut back on its activity or to reconsider its location decision. 
 
The cases in which courts have balanced external costs and external benefits are 
relatively few.  In Baines v. Baker,17 the defendants proposed to erect a hospital for 
treating smallpox patients in Coldbath Fields, London.  The plaintiff, an owner of rental 
property in the area, sued to enjoin the building as a nuisance.  The court refused to grant 
an injunction on the ground that the plaintiff’s property-value losses due to fears, even 
though rational, were not recoverable through a nuisance action; and that the public 
benefits of the hospital would justify the external costs.  Lord Hardwicke said, “I am of 
opinion that it is a charity likely to prove of great advantage to mankind.  Such an 
hospital must not be far from town, because those that are attacked with that disorder in a 
natural way may not be carried far.”18 
 
The most famous and controversial American nuisance case involving the balancing of 
external costs and benefits is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson.19  The defendants 
operated a coal mine, and in the process of operation brought up underground water.  The 
water brought up by the mining operation flowed into and polluted a surface stream that 
was used, three miles away, by the plaintiff as a source of water for “domestic 
purposes”.20  The court described the case as pitting the interests of the leading industry 
of the state against riparian property owners.  It also characterized the case as a purely 
                                                 
17 (1752) Ambler 158; for a summary, see Nathaniel Cleveland Moak & John Thomas Cook, Reports of 
Cases Decided by English Courts: with Notes and References, 1884, at 368-69, text available online at: 
http://books.google.com/books?id=i3UyAAAAIAAJ.  
18 Id. at 159. 
19 113 Pa. 126; 6 Atl. 453 (1886).  For an insightful discussion that anticipates my treatment of Sanderson, 
see Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional 
Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to the Large-Number Externality Problems, 46 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 1017-1020 (1996). 
20 6 Atl, at 454. 
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private nuisance, not affecting general access to usable water, because the community 
had “abundant pure water from other sources.”21  The court held that 
 
[m]ere private personal inconveniences, arising in this way and under such 
circumstances, must yield to the necessities of a great public industry, 
which, although in the hand of a private corporation, subserves a great 
public interest.  To encourage the development of the great natural 
resources of a country trifling inconveniences to particular persons must 
sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community.22 
 
In an explicit reference balancing externalities, the court concluded its opinion by quoting 
approvingly from a dissent in one of the earlier decisions in the same case: 
 
The population, wealth, and improvements are the result of mining, and of 
that alone.  The plaintiffs knew, when they purchased their property, that 
they were in a mining region.  They were in a city born of mining 
operations, and which had become rich and populous as a result thereof.  
They knew that all mountain streams in that section were affected by mine 
water, or were liable to be.  Having enjoyed the advantages which coal 
mining confers, I see no great hardship, nor any violence to equity, in their 
also accepting the inconveniences necessarily resulting from the 
business.23 
 
It should be clear that the externality balancing test, in isolation, implies a movement 
toward expanding strict liability as an economy becomes wealthier.  For a subsistence 
level economy, the introduction of industry should have enormous beneficial 
externalities.  But as the wealth and industry expand, the positive externalities of 
industrial expansion probably diminish.24  And wealthier consumers will attach a greater 
valuation to recreational and aesthetic interests.  Thus, Sanderson may have been a case 
of its time, and rather near the end of it too. 
 
D. Scope of Liability: Extra-Sensitive Plaintiffs, Proximate Cause, and Coming to the 
Nuisance 
 
Nuisance law does not provide for compensation to the extra-sensitive plaintiff, such as 
one who complains of illnesses caused by such ordinary activity as the ringing of church 
bells.25  The justification for this well-settled piece of the law is best understood in terms 
of the model of this paper.  A nuisance exists when the externalized costs associated with 
an activity are substantially in excess of externalized benefits, or the externalized costs 
                                                 
21 Id., at 459 
22 Id. 
23 Id., at 465. 
24 In particular, the positive externalities created by the enhancement of market infrastructure and other 
social benefits from industrialization diminish.  However, even in a wealth, industrialized economy, there 
may be commercial activities that throw off external benefits.  For example, information technology, by 
enhancing the dissemination of information through society, carries significant positive externalities. 
25 Rogers v. Elliott, 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888). 
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are not reciprocated by other background activities.  The comparison of externalized 
costs and benefits is made with respect to statistical averages, not to any particular 
plaintiff.  If, on the basis of statistical averages, the externalized costs associated with an 
activity are not substantially greater than the externalized benefits, then the activity is not 
a nuisance under the theory here, even though an individual within the community might 
suffer an injury from it. 
 
The extra-sensitive plaintiff problem is closely related to the scope of nuisance law, or, in 
legal terminology, proximate causation.  Courts have limited the scope of nuisance 
liability to injuries that are connected in a predictable way to the externalized risk.  
Injuries that are not predictably related to the externalized risk are not within the scope of 
strict nuisance liability.  The externality model suggests a reason for this: to focus 
liability on the cost externalizing features of the defendant’s activity rather than the 
activity per se.  Suppose the victim drives his car into the defendant’s malarial pond.  To 
permit a strict liability action in this case would fail to tax the defendant’s activity for the 
specific risk creation that the law aims to discourage. 
 
A more detailed justification for the proximate cause rule in nuisance law, and in strict 
liability generally, can be gleaned from the model of the previous section.  The 
externalized risk component, v(y), can be considered to consist of two subcomponents, 
v1(y) + v2(y), where v1(y) is the normal risk externalized by activities of the defendant’s 
type and v2(y) is the special additional risk that makes the defendant’s activity a nuisance.  
For example, in the case of a malarial pond, v1(y) is the risk externalized by any water 
storage, and v2(y) is the malaria risk.  The proximate cause rule excludes liability for the 
normal risk component.26  If, as nuisance law implicitly assumes, normal risks are 
balanced off by positive externalities, then excluding liability for normal risk leads to 
optimal activity levels.  In terms of Figure 1, the proximate cause rule leads the actor 
choose the activity level associated with point C rather than point E. 
 
Sometimes defendants argue that plaintiffs should not be able to recover because they 
“came to the nuisance”.  The coming to the nuisance defense is valid in some cases, but 
not in all.  The model of this paper provides a justification for the ambiguous treatment of 
the coming-to-the-nuisance defense.  As a general matter, strict nuisance liability hinges 
on a comparison of externalized costs to externalized benefits (or to reciprocal 
background risks).27  The historical pattern should not be controlling.  However, whether 
                                                 
26 In a more complicated model, there is another component of risk that would also be excluded.  When the 
special risk of the defendant’s activity is realized, there will often be remote injuries associated with it.  For 
example, a defendant who engages in blasting may generate harms that are caused by the blasting (in the 
“but for” sense), but that are remotely connected at best (e.g., suppose the victim is surprised by and 
watches the blasting, causing him to be late to a meeting, or to get hit by a bolt of lightning).  The law 
excludes this component of risk also.  The explanation suggested by this model is that the exclusion avoids 
over-internalization.  If such risks were not excluded, courts would be required to hold defendants strictly 
liable for every injury that can be traced in a but-for sense to the special risk generated by the defendant’s 
activity.  That would be an infinitely large set of risks. 
27 In this model, the balance of externalities determines whether strict liability is appropriate.  This may 
seem inconsistent with Coase’s analysis.  Coase famously described nuisances as instances of conflicting 
uses of property, and suggested that either use (the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s) could be viewed as the 
interfering activity.  In this model, the interfering activity is easy to identify: when the external costs of an 
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a victim moved to a nuisance is often important in determining whether externalized 
costs are unreasonable.  A victim’s knowing and voluntary decision to move to the 
nuisance is evidence that he does not perceive the externalized costs to be greater than the 
externalized benefits.  For this reason, the coming-to-the-nuisance factor remains a 
relevant consideration in the balancing test for nuisances. 
 
E. Malarial Ponds Revisited 
 
1. Nature of Invasion, as Private and as Public Nuisance 
 
The five-factor nuisance test can be applied to the case of a malarial pond as a private 
nuisance.  Since the test addresses the reasonableness of an invasion, the first question 
that should be considered, before applying the test, is that of intent.  The malarial pond 
could be intentional in either of two senses.  The first, which is typical of nuisance cases, 
is that the defendant is aware of the existence of the pond and the likely negative 
externalities.  The second is that the defendant is not only aware of the pond, but has 
prepared it for the purpose of inflicting harm on adjacent landowners.  If this latter sense 
of intent is consistent with the evidence, the plaintiff might prevail on an offensive 
battery claim, since preparing a malarial pond for injuring a neighbor is indistinguishable 
from poisoning the neighbor’s food.  But I will assume for the remainder that the first 
sense of intent applies, which is sufficient to support a nuisance claim. 
 
A malarial pond would appear to be something that could be avoided with reasonable 
care, but suppose the burden of preventing the formation of such a pond is extremely high 
for the defendant; perhaps because the defendant is not present at his property for long 
periods, or because his business involves frequent excavations on the property.  If the 
burden of preventing the creation of such a pond is extremely high, it may be difficult to 
hold the defendant negligent for his failure to maintain the property.  As long as the 
defendant has not created the pond with the purpose to injure neighbors, nuisance rather 
than negligence would appear to be the appropriate claim.  This disposes of the first two 
factors of the nuisance test. 
 
The third factor of the test asks whether the malarial pond is a common activity.  In the 
deep South during slavery, slaveowners flooded their rice fields, and then fled their 
plantations during the summer because of the risk of malaria.28  In that setting, perhaps 
one could argue that the malarial pond was a common activity, and a costly but necessary 
feature of the local agricultural industry.  But outside of such a special case, the malarial 
pond is an uncommon activity. 
 
The fourth factor asks whether it is appropriate to say that the plaintiff assumed the risk 
because of the location of the nuisance.  Perhaps so in a community in which malarial 
ponds were a common byproduct of local industry.  In such a community, one could 
                                                                                                                                                 
activity substantially exceed the background level of reciprocal external costs, or when they are far in 
excess of externalized benefits, then the activity is properly viewed as “interfering” and a candidate for 
strict liability.  
28 See, e.g., William Dusinberre, Them Dark Days: Slavery in the American Rice Swamps 54 (2000). 
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argue that the benefits of local industry made the risk of malaria a necessary cost of doing 
business.  Outside of such a setting, the assumption of risk theory would be inappropriate. 
 
The final factor looks directly at the positive and negative externalities.  Where a local 
industry becomes the backbone of a local economy, the beneficial externalities are likely 
to be substantial.  Many of the external benefits will be capitalized in asset values.  But 
complete capitalization of the value of all of the beneficial externalities is unlikely.  Two 
obvious beneficial externalities that are associated with industrialization are knowledge 
spillovers and the support of a market infrastructure.  These benefits have to be taken into 
account in evaluating the net social harm from an industry that produces a substantial 
negative externality.  In the case of malarial ponds, most industries will fail this test.  
Indeed, even the example of southern coastal agriculture during slavery may have failed 
the test, since the slaveholders typically fled their farms and left their slaves to suffer the 
burden of disease. 
 
The foregoing analysis applies straightforwardly to the public nuisance setting, and also 
suggests that there is a common core to the public and private nuisance doctrines.  While 
private nuisance protects a possessor of property, public nuisance protects an individual 
in the exercise of public rights unconnected to land ownership or any other special legal 
status.  The “public plaintiff” is assumed by the law to have a right to exercise public 
rights (e.g., to travel on public roads, to occupy public space). 
 
The theory presented here provides a justification for the rights protected by public 
nuisance doctrine.  They are the same rights protected by private nuisance doctrine.  The 
model of this paper identifies a nuisance by the balance of external costs and external 
benefits.  This has nothing to do with the status of the plaintiff, as long as the plaintiff is 
capable of experiencing the positive and negative externalities created by the defendant.  
In other words, the externality-based theory of nuisance doctrine suggests that the law 
aims to discourage nuisance activities, not to protect specific types of victim. Whether the 
victim is sitting on adjacent land or roving about, the goal of the law should be the same. 
 
In this model, the same factors considered above would point to the conclusion that the 
malarial pond is an intentional and unreasonable invasion of public rights, specifically the 
rights to be free from an offensive contact and to travel about on public roads.  The 
malarial pond does not imprison the public plaintiff because he is free to travel to his 
destination by other routes.  But it severely interferes with the exercise of public rights, 
just as it would severely interfere with the quiet use and enjoyment of property by an 
adjacent landholder. 
 
2. Particular Harm Requirement 
 
The only remaining part of public nuisance doctrine that needs to be explained is the rule 
that prevents the plaintiff from suing unless he has experienced a loss that is particular 
and not common to the public.  In the malarial pond case, the particular harm requirement 
would be satisfied by a plaintiff who suffers a mosquito bite that results in malaria. 
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Why not allow any person who has suffered an inconvenience from the existence of the 
malarial pond to bring suit under public nuisance doctrine?  I have already noted the 
verifiability problem; the administrative difficulty of distinguishing false from valid 
claims when the plaintiff asserts that he has suffered merely an inconvenience.  A victim 
who claims that he had to alter his route to avoid the risk of malaria cannot be 
distinguished easily from one who did not suffer such a cost.  This is probably a 
sufficient reason for the particular harm requirement.   
 
Another administrative argument for the harm requirement is based on operational 
deterrence.  The common harms suffered by victims of public nuisances are typically 
insufficiently harmful to the average victim to justify an expensive lawsuit.  Only the rare 
individual will find it worth his time and money to bring a lawsuit over the inconvenience 
of having to alter his route or to swat mosquitoes.  In light of this, the common law rule 
barring claims for common harms could have served the function of locating standing to 
sue in a single actor, the state, that would presumably sue to prevent the aggregate harm.  
Since few individuals would have an incentive to sue, underdeterrence would be the 
practical result of a public nuisance regime that relied on individual claims to bring about 
optimal deterrence.  This is also a sufficient reason for the particular harm requirement. 
 
However, suppose these administrative concerns could be avoided.  Is there still a reason 
suggested by the theory of nuisance doctrine for denying common harm claims? 
 
The argument from theory runs as follows.  The inconvenience of having to change one’s 
route or to swat mosquitoes is indistinguishable from normal background inconveniences 
experienced in the exercise of public rights.  From the perspective of the public plaintiff, 
the costs externalized by the malarial pond are not substantially different from the costs 
occasionally externalized by other activities.  Plenty of other activities might require the 
public plaintiff to alter his route or to swat flies away.  The only difference in the case of 
a continuing interference, such as a malarial pond, is one of frequency.  At some point, 
frequency of interference from a particular source can pose such a serious invasion that it 
becomes distinguishable from background inconveniences.  But this line is difficult to 
determine as a general matter and will vary with characteristics of the plaintiff that are 
unobservable to the court (e.g., how the plaintiff uses the road). 
 
It follows that under the externality-based theory presented here the default rule should 
deny the strict liability claim of a plaintiff who complains about common interferences.  
These would fall in the category of reciprocal harms examined in the model above – 
reciprocal in the sense that they are indistinguishable from normal background 
interferences.  People exercising public rights often interfere with each other’s exercise of 
those rights, as when a driver’s car breaks down and blocks traffic.  However, if the 
interferences rise to the level that the plaintiff can demonstrate a harm that is substantially 
greater than that of others exercising the same public right, then the particular harm 
requirement should be considered satisfied.  For example, suppose the plaintiff has a 
business that depends on his ability to exercise a public right – such as travel on a 
particular road – and the interference effectively prevents the plaintiff from exercising 
that right. 
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The key to this argument is that the background level of interference from activities is 
generally greater (though not in all cases) in the exercise of public rights than in the 
exercise of private property rights.  Since the background interferences are greater 
generally, a larger number of activities that interfere with those rights will throw off 
external costs that are reciprocal in nature to the routine background interferences 
observed in the public setting.  This argument is based on statistical averages, and treats 
the public sphere the same as a private setting in which a relatively high level of 
interferences were common and reciprocally shared. 
 
This is still consistent with the view that an excessively sensitive plaintiff cannot collect 
damages.  The reason is that if, on statistical averages, the interference is one that would 
not trouble the ordinary individual exercising public rights, it will not provide a basis for 
a plaintiff who is unusually sensitive to claim damages under public nuisance doctrine. 
 
The theoretical case for denying the strict liability claim when the interferences suffered 
by the plaintiff are common to the public rests on both the administrative grounds 
(specifically, inability to tell whether the plaintiff suffered any interference and the 
operational underdeterrence) and the higher level of background interference in the 
public sphere.  In spite of this, it is clear that the aggregate interference created by 
activity such as a malarial pond will be greater and more concentrated than the typical 
random interference.  This implies that if all of the public plaintiffs sued as a class, or the 
state sued on their behalf, the strict liability claim should be permitted – provided all of 
the conditions examined in the nuisance test are satisfied. 
 
F. Error Costs and Shut Downs 
 
If damage payments accurately reflected all of the losses suffered by victims, there would 
never be a need to issue an injunction.  Notice that in Figure 1 if external costs are very 
high and external benefits are nonexistent, the optimal scale of the offending activity is 
zero.  If damage awards correctly captured all of the losses suffered by victims, every 
case involving extremely high external costs would be shut down, in effect, by damage 
awards.29  Given this, why are injunctions are ever issued? 
 
The economic case for injunctions is that damage awards do not compensate for all of the 
losses suffered by victims of nuisances.  The more specific reasons differ in the private 
and public nuisance settings.  In the private nuisance setting, a sufficiently offensive 
invasion will impose large subjective losses on victims.  For example, suppose the 
offending activity sends so much black smoke over the plaintiff’s property that it is 
impossible to live on the property.  Then the defendant has effectively seized the property 
of the plaintiff.  A damage award in this case would compensate the plaintiff for the 
market value of the property, but not for the subjective loss from expropriation.  The 
injunction is preferable because it forces offending activities to either pay for the full 
losses (objective and subjective) or shut down. 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and 
Damage Remedies, 32 Stan, L. Rev. 1075 (1980). 
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In the public nuisance setting, it should be clear that damage awards will fail to 
compensate plaintiffs for all of their losses.  The rule governing damages does not 
provide compensation for ordinary inconveniences.  However, even if victims could be 
compensated for ordinary inconveniences, most would not sue because the cost of suit 
would be to be too high relative to the likely damage awards.  Given this, the injunction 
is socially preferable. 
 
The injunctions can be viewed in both cases as minimizing error costs.  Damage awards 
could in theory lead to optimal shut down decisions, but the types of error built in to the 
strict liability system are obvious.  Subjective losses are not compensated in the private 
nuisance cases and the standard inconveniences are not compensated through public 
nuisance lawsuits.  Because of these gaps, nuisances that should be shut down may easily 
escape that outcome in a system in which courts applied only liability rules to nuisance 
activities. 
 
V. Modern Enforcement Actions 
 
A. Lead Paint 
 
Public nuisance lawsuits have become attractive to government enforcement agents as a 
method of resolving the costs of lead paint abatement.30  Lead paint has been banned 
since 1978, but it remains in many homes.  Public nuisance lawsuits have been brought 
against lead paint manufacturers in Missouri,31 New Jersey,32 and most recently Rhode 
Island.33  In this part I will ask whether the lead paint lawsuits are consistent with the 
theory of nuisance law, taking a generous view of the plaintiffs’ claims. 
 
The traditional private nuisance is a smoke-belching factory, and traditional public 
nuisances are things like malarial ponds or highway obstructions.  The lead paint 
litigation seems at first glance not to fit in either of the traditional nuisance categories.  
Unlike the smoke-belching factory, lead paint does not waft over and engulf the homes of 
victims.  Many of the victims contracted to have their homes coated in lead paint.  And 
unlike the highway obstruction or malarial pond, the lead paint coatings did not interfere 
with public rights in general; the paint interferes with rights associated with private 
property ownership.  In addition, many of the owners of homes coated in lead paint made 
a decision to purchase the homes, an example of “coming to the nuisance”; and the risk 
of harm is a function of the care taken by victims.  Many of these distinctions could be 
sufficient to remove the lead paint cases from the nuisance category. 
 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Howard Markel, Getting the Lead Out: The Rhode Island Lead Paint Trials 
and Their Impact on Children’s Health, Howard Markel, 297 JAMA 2773, June 27, 2007 (discussing health 
problems caused by lead paint and history of litigation). 
31 City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007) (rejecting public nuisance claim 
because of failure to identify responsible actors). 
32 In re Lead Paint Litigation, 191 N.J. 405, 924 A.2d 484 (2007) (rejecting public nuisance theory as 
precluded by New Jersey statute requiring lead paint abatement by property owners). 
33 State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007). 
 21
Start with the obvious distinction between clouds of smoke, the most traditional type of 
nuisance, and lead paint.  Smoke, fumes, and noise have the property that they make it 
undesirable to remain on your property.  Lead paint, in contrast, does not appear to drive 
people from their homes, or substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of 
property.  But this is a questionable distinction.  If we focus instead on the nature of the 
injury, then nuisance doctrine is a potentially reasonable fit.  The victims of lead paint 
claim that they live with the continuing risk of injury to their children from consuming 
paint chips, and there is no obvious public benefit to offset this risk.  If a cloud of smoke 
caused the same continuing risk, we would have no trouble calling it a nuisance. 
 
1. Public versus Private 
 
The distinction between the invasion of public and private rights is also unimportant in 
the lead paint context.  Many public nuisances are also private nuisances.  A malarial 
pond interferes with public rights as well as private property rights.  As noted earlier, one 
of the administrative reasons for the particular harm requirement in public nuisance law 
is the operational underdeterrence that would be observed when many victims suffer a 
low level harm – as in the case of people inconvenienced by the existence of a malarial 
pond.  Few of the victims of inconvenience – those forced to change their routes and to 
swat mosquitoes – would have an incentive to bring suit.  For this reason, public nuisance 
doctrine appoints the state as litigant on their behalf. 
 
The characteristic of many victims suffering low-level harms is certainly observed in the 
lead paint crisis.  For the victims whose children have ingested lead paint and suffered 
injury as a result, their harms would satisfy the particularity requirement.  However, 
probably most of those living in lead paint coated homes have not suffered serious 
injuries, and would therefore have little incentive to sue.  On operational deterrence 
grounds, the treatment of lead paint as a public nuisance is defensible. 
 
2. Intervening and Contributory Conduct 
 
One set of special issues in the lead paint cases revolves around contributory conduct on 
the part of the victims, and intervening conduct by others (e.g., landlords).  For one, the 
lead paint entered the homes by the consent of previous owners.  Because of this one 
could argue that the lead paint nuisance is not the result of any invasion at all. 
 
As a basis for distinguishing lead paint from traditional nuisance cases, the contractual 
nature of the original entry is a contestable argument.  Even if the victim consented to the 
invasion, he may have a valid basis for a nuisance claim if he did not have any 
forewarning of the type of interference that would result.34  In other words, risk 
externalization resulted from informational asymmetry in this setting.  Alternatively, one 
could argue that the plaintiffs came to the nuisance because they purchased homes with 
lead paint.  This may be true of new victims; presumably the market has incorporated any 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative, 548 N.W.2d 829 (Wis. 1996). 
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negative price effects due to lead paint today.35  But the market was unlikely to be 
effective at regulating the scale of lead paint coatings before the 1978 ban because 
consumers were unaware of the risks. 
 
The contributory negligence of third parties or victims in lead coated homes is another 
basis for distinguishing the lead paint cases from traditional nuisance cases.  In the 
standard nuisance cases, the victims can do little to avoid the interference as long as they 
remain on their properties.  In the lead paint setting, the victims can avoid the harm by 
ensuring that their children do not consume paint chips or by maintaining their homes.  
Moreover, there are third parties, specifically landlords, who by maintaining their 
properties can virtually eliminate the risk that residents are exposed to lead paint. 
 
Returning to the theory of nuisance doctrine, this is an important distinction.  If the 
residual risk from an activity is negligible when actors take care, then strict liability is 
inappropriate.  There is no need to use strict liability to reduce the scale of an activity 
when it imposes no extraordinary risk when conducted with reasonable care.  In the case 
of apartment tenants exposed to lead paint, landlords are presumably the parties who have 
a duty to minimize the risk. 
 
In the case of direct victims, their possible contributory fault is not entirely effective as a 
basis for distinguishing lead paint from traditional nuisance cases.  It may be 
prohibitively expensive for relatively poor parents to prevent children from being 
exposed to and consuming paint chips.  The residents in lead coated buildings are, at least 
arguably, in the same position as landholders facing invasive smoke from a nearby 
factory.36 
 
3. Core Issues 
 
Under the theory set out in this paper, strict nuisance liability is desirable because it 
discourages the scale of an activity with negative externalities.  The lead paint was 
applied long ago, largely before the full risks were known, and is currently banned.  
There is little possibility now that strict nuisance liability will do anything to discourage 
the use of lead paint.  The primary function of the existing lawsuits will be to redistribute 
resources from defendants to the firms hired for abatement purposes and to owners of 
                                                 
35 Interestingly, there is virtually no statistical evidence of a market discount.  Randall Lutter & Elizabeth 
Mader, Litigating Lead-Paint Based Hazards, in Regulation Through Litigation, 106-136 (W. Kip Viscusi, 
ed., 2002). The likely reason is that houses in relatively wealthy communities are continuously renovated 
by owners.  The pre-1978 houses in those communities are not substantially affected by the existence of 
lead coatings from earlier years.  The lead coatings have been removed or painted over to the point that the 
risk of lead exposure is low.  The lead paint problem is largely one of homes and rental housing in 
relatively poor areas. 
36 I am taking a sympathetic view of the plaintiffs’ claims.  A less sympathetic view would assert that the 
danger is a function of home maintenance, and that anyone who fails to maintain a home will over time 
expose the residents to hazards.  This implies that with respect to victims who own their homes, lead paint 
should not be treated differently from any number of potential hazards that might appear within the home.  
Under this less sympathetic view, the plaintiffs’ strict liability claims should be dismissed on causation 
grounds.  With respect to victims who are tenants in apartment buildings, the incentive to maintain will be 
considerably weaker. 
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lead coated homes.37  Unlike the previous considerations, this is a fundamental distinction 
between the lead paint problem and standard nuisance cases. 
 
One could argue that since the market did not effectively discourage the use of lead paint, 
because its dangers were largely unknown to consumers, strict liability is necessary to 
regulate the scale of its use.  That would be a valid argument for applying nuisance 
doctrine to the lead paint problem if lead paint were still in use today.  But it is not in use.  
The lawsuits come roughly a generation after the ban on lead paint. 
 
Still, one could argue that liability even 30 years after the use of a dangerous product 
could serve a useful incentive purpose if the actors responsible for it could be identified.  
On the assumption that the responsible actors were rational and forward looking, this is 
an acceptable argument.  Even if the penalty falls 30 years after the offensive act, it still 
may be proper on incentive grounds to apply the penalty. 
 
Holding lead paint sellers strictly liable could have the appropriate incentive effects, 
though under some rather restrictive conditions.  First, the sellers responsible for the 
current lead problem would have to be identified to a reasonable degree and liability 
would have to be allocated in a manner that tracks each seller’s contribution to the risk.  
Second, the financial link between the existing defendants and the ones who initially sold 
the lead paint would have to be strong enough that applying strict liability today could be 
viewed as having an incentive effect on the initial sale decision.  Third, the liability 
would have to be limited to those actors, or the successors to those actors, who sold lead 
paint with knowledge of its risks to homeowners.  These are difficult conditions to 
satisfy. 
 
4. Identification and Causation  
 
The common law, with doctrines such as res ipsa loquitor and the alternate liability rule 
of Summers v. Tice,38 long ago moved away from a strict requirement that every injury be 
linked to an identifiable defendant.  More recently, market share liability theories have 
moved the law further in the direction of permitting liability findings against actors who 
are identified with plaintiffs’ harms primarily through statistical inference. 
 
The lead paint cases attempt to stretch the modern causation doctrines to new limits.  One 
case to reject such an attempt is Skipworth v. Lead Industries Association.39  The court 
rejected the application of market share liability to lead paint defendants on the ground 
that market share statistics are only weakly correlated with the risks externalized by lead 
paint.  Not all lead paints are equally harmful.  The degree of bioavailability of lead 
differs among types of lead paint. 
                                                 
37 The gains to home owners probably make up a minimal part of this wealth transfer.  If a relatively poor 
owner is informed that his home is defective and he must vacate it to allow for abatement, that will present 
an enormous expense to the homeowner.  By far the cheapest method of curing the problem would be to 
hire a painting crew to paint over the lead coated portions, but that probably would be considered an 
impermissible form of abatement. 
38 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
39 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997). 
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This paper’s model suggests that statistical theories of causation and identification are 
appropriate for nuisance claims generally.  The essence of a nuisance, and of strict 
liability theories across the board, is that the defendant’s activity throws off external 
costs, even when conducted with reasonable care, that are substantially greater than those 
of other local activities or substantially greater than any benefits externalized by the 
actor.  Since the focus is on risk externalization, liability can be allocated according to a 
statistical identification of risk sources. 
 
For example, suppose two malarial ponds owned by different defendants create a public 
nuisance within a single community.  Suppose, in addition, that the plaintiff satisfies the 
particular harm requirement of public nuisance law, because he has contracted malaria 
from a mosquito bite.  Rather than require the plaintiff to identify the pond from which 
the disease-carrying mosquito attacked the plaintiff, it would be preferable to use some 
method of allocating liability based on relative risk externalization by the two defendants.  
Relative risk externalization might be measured by the relative sizes of the ponds.  As 
long as the relative risk measure achieves an acceptable degree of statistical accuracy, the 
damage judgments will be allocated among the defendants in a manner that provides 
optimal deterrence incentives. 
 
Although statistical causation and identification methods appear to be preferable in 
general in public nuisance settings, the lead paint cases introduce additional hurdles.  A 
market share liability approach fails as a measure of relative risk externalization among 
defendants, for many reasons.  Market shares within the relevant geographic market may 
differ from national market shares.  Market shares change over time.  The level of 
bioavailability of lead differs among types of lead paint.  Because of the passage of time 
and corporate reorganizations, the link between existing defendants and the actors 
responsible for the risk is often weak. 
 
Market share liability seems, at first glance, to have the same appeal, as a solution to the 
liability allocation problem in the lead paint context, as does the approach of allocating 
liability for malaria according to the relative sizes of malarial ponds.  However, market 
shares have changed over the century or so of lead paint use, while malarial ponds are 
fixed in relative size during the period of injury.  In addition, there is heterogeneity in the 
risk externalized by each lead application within each generation, and the risk has 
changed with each generation of application.  Perhaps these statistical difficulties are not 
insurmountable, but they certainly make the task of statistical allocation of liability far 
more difficult than in the standard market share liability case. 
 
This is not necessarily the end of the matter.  If there is a random link between the 
imposition of liability and the level of risk thrown off by actors, strict liability could still 
serve a useful incentive function.  Suppose, for example, that a group of offending actors 
can determine the average risk externalized by their activities as a mass, but not the 
specific risk externalized by each actor.  An allocation rule for damages that tracks 
average risk externalization, though failing to accurately capture relative risk 
externalization, might still provide the right activity incentives.  In other words, even 
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though different types of lead paint may generate different levels of risk based on 
bioavailability, it may be that the lead paint manufacturers were aware only of the mean 
risk externalization at the time of marketing.  An allocation of damages based on mean 
externalization would be responsive to their incentives. 
 
The danger in using a random allocation is observed where some offending actors have 
intentionally adopted activities that externalize relatively low risks.  Those actors will be 
punished too harshly under the random allocation rule and the most offensive actors will 
be punished too lightly.  If it is costly to reduce the level of risk externalization, a random 
allocation method will have the perverse effect of encouraging the most offensive levels 
of risk externalization. 
 
5. Intention and Incentives 
 
This paper’s model implies that the intentionality requirement serves an important 
incentive role in strict liability doctrine.  If the actor is not aware of or cannot foresee the 
costs externalized to others, then strict liability cannot influence the actor’s incentives.  
This is the reason nuisance doctrine imposes an intentionality requirement. 
 
It is alleged that there was a period in which lead paint sellers were aware of and hid the 
risks of their products.40  However, that period, if it exists,41 represents only a portion of 
the history of the use of lead paint.42  Strict nuisance liability can be justified on 
economic grounds only for the actors who marketed lead paint within the time period in 
which the risks were known (or should have been known) by the actors – an issue 
commonly referred to as the “state of the art” defense.  If the average bioavailability level 
of lead in 1950 was considered safe for consumer use at that time, it would be 
inconsistent with the theory of nuisance liability to hold the sellers who met that industry 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Richard Rabin, The lead industry and child lead poisoning. Synthesis/Regeneration. 2006;41:1-
10. http://www.greens.org/s-r/41/41-02.html. 
41 Knowledge on the part of the industry that lead paint is poisonous does not immediately imply 
knowledge of the risks currently documented.  One of the interesting features of the lead paint problem is 
the increasingly stringent safe exposure thresholds established by the federal government.  See Lutter & 
Mader, supra note 35, at 125. These increasing standards imply that a level of lead that might have been 
considered safe in, say 1950, would no longer be safe.  Holding paint makers liable on nuisance grounds 
today because of the increased assessment of risk amounts to punishing them for activity that was 
considered safe at its time. 
42 On the industry’s knowledge, see Rabin, supra note 40 (At different times and circumstances the lead 
paint industry has stated that it eliminated lead from consumer paints by 1940, during the 1940s and 1950s, 
and by 1955. In 1970, in testimony to Congress on legislation to ban residential lead paint, the General 
Counsel to the National Paint, Varnish and Lacquer Association declared that the paint industry had halted 
the sale of lead paint for interior use over 30 years previously…   
Recently, in response to actual and threatened lawsuits against the lead pigment industry, brought 
by both lead-poisoned children and states and cities, the lead industry has claimed that it phased out lead 
paint in the 1940s and 1950s when it learned of the dangers of lead paint to children. 
However, since lead paint’s hazards were well-established by the 1920s, demonstrating that they 
ceased lead paint production in 1945 instead of 1955 would not appreciably reduce the industry’s 
culpability. But the point is moot, since several federal government housing surveys conducted since the 
mid-1970s have conclusively shown that lead paint was applied to houses even past 1970.) 
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average strictly liable today on the ground that the 1950 average bioavailability level is 
now considered unacceptably dangerous. 
 
Nuisance doctrine sometimes holds actors liable even though they began their offensive 
activity at a time when there were no neighbors to complain of the interference.  For 
example, a smoke-belching factory might become a nuisance one day, because a 
residential area grows up around it, when it was not a nuisance at its beginning.  One 
could try to extend this reasoning to argue that lead paint manufacturers should be found 
liable for a nuisance even for the period in which the harmful effects were not evident to 
them.  But this argument is based on a misinterpretation of nuisance doctrine’s function.  
Nuisance doctrine may hold an actor liable even though his activity was not a nuisance at 
its inception, but it still must be the case that the actor was aware of the invasive 
externalities of its activity.  A smoke-belching factory may not be a nuisance at its 
inception because no neighbors are in its community, but even at that starting date it is 
fair to assume that the factory owners are aware of the invasive character of its emissions.  
If lead paint manufacturers were not aware of the risks for a portion of its time on the 
market, there would be little point on incentive grounds in holding them liable for injuries 
arising over that portion of time. 
 
Thus, in addition to the problem of determining a method of identification among 
potential defendants (some of whom no longer exist), the lead paint cases involve the 
difficulty of identifying proper defendants within the time period of intentional conduct.  
Both of these are substantial hurdles in the way of applying nuisance law to the lead paint 
abatement problem. 
 
It is difficult to say as a matter of theory that the lead paint cases could never satisfy the 
requirements of nuisance doctrine.  Perhaps plaintiffs can fashion a case that meets the 
requirements suggested by the theory.  The existing cases are far from the mark.43 
 
Even if all of the lead paint manufacturers were fully aware of the risks for the entire 
period of its marketing, and all of the responsible manufacturers could be identified and 
brought into court, the nuisance determination remains somewhat more difficult in the 
lead paint cases than in the standard nuisance.  Presumably, there were few if any paint 
products that were entirely safe for consumption by children during the period in which 
lead paint was marketed.  If the lead paint manufacturers faced a choice of using leaded 
paint or some other type (e.g., solvent-based paint), the tradeoff may have been between a 
paint that chips less frequently, with more harmful consequences from each flake, and 
one that chips more frequently, with less harmful consequences from each flake.  Over 
the long term, the early alternatives to lead-based paint may have generated equivalent 
risks.  If the real choice facing society was between banning the use of paint entirely, or 
using paint with some risks, then the nuisance determination is no longer as clear as it 
may seem to some observers today. 
 
                                                 
43 Consider State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007).  The court eliminated 
the requirement of intent, see id., at *26.  The causation test adopted by the court does not attempt to 
determine relative risk allocations within the pool of victims, see id., at *18-43.   
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B. Guns 
 
Injuries from gun use in urban areas have provoked another recent attempt to use public 
nuisance doctrine as a tool for solving a public health issue.44  Most of the public 
nuisance lawsuits against gun manufacturers have been dismissed since Congress passed 
a statute banning tort suits against gun manufacturers in 2005, but some of them remain 
alive as exceptions are read into the immunity statute.  In spite of the decline in litigation, 
it is worthwhile to consider the implications of this paper’s model for such claims, largely 
to compare with its implications for the lead paint lawsuits. 
 
In what sense could the sale of guns be analogized to a public nuisance?  Suppose an 
actor stored large quantities of explosives in a residential area, and thieves broke into the 
storage room and set the explosives off, destroying nearby residences.  This would be a 
straightforward case for applying the Rylands-based doctrine of strict liability for extra-
hazardous activities.  And since Rylands and nuisance doctrine have the same legal roots, 
a nuisance action would be applicable as an alternative. 
 
The argument from the perspective of plaintiffs is that the gun distribution networks are 
similar to explosive stores.  Accordingly, some guns are so destructive that they should 
be viewed as the equivalent of explosives.  Bringing them into a community is equivalent 
to introducing an extraordinary risk.  An alternative theory for plaintiffs is that gun 
distributors knowingly permit their products to fall into the hands of criminal gangs.  As 
nuisance theories, these arguments are not implausible. 
 
The analogy with explosives also sheds light on the limits of the public nuisance theories 
used against gun sellers.  One is the proximate cause issue; another is the cost-benefit 
balancing test. 
 
Proximate causation presents an obstacle to the application of nuisance doctrine to gun 
injuries.  Proximate cause is a wide ranging category of doctrines generally linked to the 
notion of foreseeability.  One traditional interpretation of foreseeability is that it requires 
an unbroken sequence of probabilistically connected events from the defendant’s tort to 
the victim’s injury.  The intervening conduct of a third party has sometimes been treated 
as sufficient to break the chain or sequence of probabilistic connection.45  
 
In terms of the model presented here, the proximate cause requirement serves to limit the 
scope of strict nuisance liability.  The scope is limited to injuries that are obviously 
implied by the specific risk created by the offending activity.  As I noted earlier, the 
proximate cause rule prevents strict liability from over-internalizing external costs.  
Return, for example, to the malarial pond as a nuisance.  Strict liability is limited to the 
specific risk externalized, costs related to the spread and fear of malaria, and does not 
                                                 
44 For a thorough review, see David Kairys, The Cities Take the Initiative: Public Nuisance Lawsuits 
Against Handgun Manufacturers, in Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America (Bernard E. Harcourt, ed. 
New York University Press, 2003). 
45 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 1, at 282-283. 
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apply to any accident whatsoever involving the pond.  The function of the proximate 
cause limitation in strict nuisance liability is to induce optimal activity level choices.  
 
Third-party intervention has received a special treatment in the law of strict liability.  In 
general, third-party intervention has not served as a sufficient reason for limiting liability 
in the strict liability cases.46  One exception recognized in Rylands is where the plaintiff 
himself is responsible for the escape of the dangerous element.  The doctrine suggests 
that unless the plaintiff is the party responsible for the escape, and the plaintiff has acted 
recklessly or with intent, there is no limitation on liability based on the intervention of a 
third party in the strict liability context. 
 
The treatment of third party intervention in strict liability doctrine is justifiable in light of 
this paper’s model.  If the point is to internalize the risks externalized by the defendant’s 
activity, it would make sense to hold the defendant liable even when a third party 
intentionally causes the risk to be realized.  The reason is that the risk of third party 
intervention that releases the risk to the community is, in most cases, a foreseeable 
component of introducing an extraordinary risk. 
 
In spite of all this, the gun cases are distinguishable from explosives cases.  In the 
explosives cases, the potential to destroy is sitting on the defendant’s property waiting to 
be released in one step.  The release could occur from an accident, from the reckless act 
of a third party, or from a bolt of lightning.  The risk of a release may be small, but once 
it occurs, the damage is great.  In contrast, in the gun cases distributors do not introduce 
an object that risks explosive force against the community.  Guns by themselves are no 
more dangerous than knives by themselves.  The guns pose no risk at all unless they are 
loaded; and even when loaded they become widely distributed, relatively small (in 
comparison to a bomb), and uncorrelated sources of risk.  The degree of risk connected to 
each gun is dependent on the type of individual who holds the gun. 
 
It would be entirely consistent with this paper’s model to hold a group of actors strictly 
liable for harms that result from engaging in gun play within a city.  The activity itself 
throws off an extraordinary risk.  But the act of selling guns by itself does not throw off 
that kind of risk. 
 
One could find an exception to this position.  If a gun dealer knowingly distributes guns 
directly to a criminal gang involved in urban gun warfare, that should satisfy the 
proximate cause requirement for strict nuisance liability.  On the other extreme is the 
ordinary gun distributor.  Somewhere between these two extremes a line should be drawn 
on the use of nuisance doctrine. 
 
The other major obstacle to the application of nuisance doctrine to gun distribution is 
external cost versus external benefit balancing test.  The external risks thrown off by gun 
distribution are clear to anyone who has lived in an urban area with relatively high crime.  
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Yukon Equipment v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978) (thieves 
cause explosion of storage magazine). 
 29
However, there are external benefits from gun distribution.  Guns are used by law-
abiding city residents to thwart crime. 
 
In the neighborhoods in which crime is a big problem in most cities, many ordinary law-
abiding residents have guns.  This fact is a deterrent to a great deal of criminal activity.  
Many burglaries that are not occurring now presumably would occur if the criminals 
could be sure that the homeowners did not have guns.  This is an external benefit that 
results from the ownership of guns by law-abiding city residents.  It is clearly an 
externality, because not every law-abiding resident has to have a gun for the deterrent 
effect to be generally felt among the population of criminals. 
 
I am aware of no empirical study that attempts directly to compare the external costs and 
external benefits of gun ownership.  However, much of the public nuisance discussion 
proceeds as if there are no external benefits, or as if an activity can be declared a nuisance 
merely because it creates substantial external costs.  There are substantial external 
benefits in the case of gun ownership.  The external benefits may or may not exceed the 
external costs.  But any assessment of gun distribution as a public nuisance should 
consider the external benefits. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Nuisance law has seemed confusing to many commentators, and public nuisance law an 
especially confusing part of it.  I have offered a model to make sense of it.   Nuisance 
doctrine is complicated and covers a wide array of cases, but at its core it is simple and 
straightforward.  Public nuisance law is closely related in a functional sense to private 
nuisance law.  Both parts of the law are designed to engineer optimal activity levels, by 
imposing strict liability when externalized risks are far in excess of externalized benefits 
or far in excess of background risks.  Existing nuisance doctrine is consistent with this 
model.  The new public nuisance enforcement actions – for lead paint exposure and for 
gun-related injuries, and other modern public health issues – can claim to have a basis in 
nuisance theory, but have failed so far to be framed in a form that is entirely consistent 
with nuisance doctrine or theory. 
 
 
